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ABSTRACT 
The conduct of warfare through proxies, also known as unconventional warfare, is a 
difficult feat for a nation to accomplish.  The successful employment of surrogate forces 
depends to a significant degree on the relationships cultivated between the sponsor and 
the insurgent, and the various actors between the two.  This thesis will examine the 
conduct of an Unconventional Warfare (UW) insurgency campaign from the perspective 
of Principal-Agent Theory.  The case study examined will be Operation ST CIRCUS, the 
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) support for Tibetan insurgents from 1956 to 1974.  
The research will model the principal-agent dynamics of a UW campaign at the global, 
regional, and local levels, and will demonstrate the options available for the counter-
insurgent to indirectly topple the insurgency by destabilizing the relationships between 
the principal and its agents.  By applying Principal-Agent Theory concepts to UW, this 
research will provide a new model for the examination of potential UW campaigns, and 
potential methods for countering UW campaigns conducted by global adversaries against 
U.S. interests. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence since 1953, laid a blood-stained 
leather satchel on President John F. Kennedy‘s desk.  The young president had given 
hesitant approval to continue support for Tibetan guerillas in February 1961,1 but this 
was October, and it had not been a great summer for the president, or the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).  The CIA agents involved in Operation ST CIRCUS (―ST‖ 
being the two-letter designation for Tibet) roundly agreed that they were ―grateful to be 
working with the Tibetans instead of the group involved down in the Central America 
problem with the Bay of Pigs.‖2  The president found refreshing news in Dulles's satchel.  
Tibetan guerillas captured the satchel when ambushing a regimental commander in the 
Red Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), and it was a gold mine of information.  It 
detailed internal struggles with Mao Tse-Tung's Great Leap Forward and difficulties in 
Sino-Soviet relationships.  It also contained lists of classified communication codes.  For 
several years it would be the only inside information that the CIA and State Department 
would have on Mao's China.   
However, unconventional warfare operations are not simply defined by the results 
of local raids and ambushes.  There are many layers between Pennsylvania Avenue and 
surrogate warriors, and coincident interests only last so long between global, regional, 
and local actors.  Shortly after the satchel capture, the U.S. Ambassador to India, John 
Kenneth Galbraith, demanded all proposed support for the Tibetan nation come across his 
desk for approval.  His ostensible reason for this directive was to improve U.S. relations 
with India and other regional actors.  Others, however, have noted that Ambassador 
Galbraith had significant disdain for the Tibetans.  In his own words, he was skeptical of 
the effect of dropping ―weapons, ammunition, and other supplies for dissident and deeply 
unhygienic tribesmen who had once roamed over the neighboring Tibetan countryside 
and who now relieved boredom with raids back into the territory from which they had 
                                                 
1 Mikel Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors: The Story of the CIA-Backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the 
Chinese Communist Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet (New York: Penguin, 2004), 353. 
2 Ritu Sarin and Tenzing Sonam, The Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet (BBC Television, 1998). 
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been extruded.‖3  However, CIA agents involved in the operation argued that the impact 
of Operations ST CIRCUS was much more significant than Galbraith maintained.  They 
have even stated that the abandonment of the operation was one of the two main 
conditions set forth for the United States to establish normal relations with communist 
China at the global level.4  This disparity between global, regional, and local goals and 
actions presents a problem for examination. 
Unconventional warfare operations, as currently defined in United States military 
doctrine, involve a comparatively contractual relationship between a sponsor, and his 
surrogate, with the surrogate conducting operations on behalf of the sponsor.5  
Relationships of this type risk the problem of a moral hazard, where one actor in the 
relationship may ―undertake certain actions that (a) affect the other party's valuation of 
the transaction but that (b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly.‖6  
Principal-agent theory addresses the moral hazard by identifying three key factors in the 
relationship between the principal, or sponsor, in unconventional warfare, and the agent, 
or surrogate.  The theory identifies interest alignment, information asymmetry, and risk 
preference as integral pieces that define the relationship between principal and agent.7  
These factors are certainly present in the relationship between a sponsor and surrogate in 
unconventional warfare.  In the application of agency theory to unconventional warfare, 
two questions arise: To what degree can a model of UW using a Principal-agent Theory 
framework explain the actions of sponsors, surrogates, and adversaries in an 
unconventional warfare campaign?  Furthermore, how can the components of principal-
                                                 
3 John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life in Our Times (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), 395. 
4 Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors, 382–383. 
5 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 
(Department of Defense, September 30, 2010), 486, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA469271.  According 
to JP 1-02, the definition of UW is: ―A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of 
long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are 
organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source.  It includes, 
but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional 
assisted recovery.‖  This is the definition that I will use throughout this thesis. 
6 David Marc Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 577. 
7 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,‖ The Academy of 
Management Review 14, no. 1 (January 1989): 58. 
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agent theory be identified in an unconventional warfare campaign?  The application of 
principal-agent theory provides for a novel approach to the conduct of unconventional 
warfare, and the case of the Tibetan insurgency provides an excellent case for the 
application of this model. 
A. THESIS PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The conduct of warfare through proxies, also known as unconventional warfare, is 
a difficult feat for a nation to accomplish.  The successful employment of surrogate 
forces depends to a significant degree on the relationships cultivated between the sponsor 
and the insurgent, and the various actors between the two.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine unconventional warfare (UW) operations by applying principal-agent theory to 
the global, regional, and local relationships in a UW operation.  The thesis relies on 
Operation ST CIRCUS, the CIA's support for Tibetan insurgents resisting the invading 
forces of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1956 to 1974, to evaluate the 
strength and applicability of the model.  The research models the principal-agent 
dynamics of a UW campaign at the global, regional, and local levels, and demonstrates 
the options available for the counter-insurgent to indirectly topple the insurgency by 
destabilizing the relationships between the principal and its agents.  By applying 
principal-agent theory concepts to UW, this research w provides a new model for the 
examination of potential UW campaigns, and potential methods for countering UW 
campaigns conducted by global adversaries against the interests of the United States. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I have divided the literature on this subject into theoretical and historical works.  
The theoretical literature comments on the dynamics of principal-agent relationships, and 
the basic concepts, definitions, and models of agency theory.  The historical literature 
provides empirical data by examining accounts of Operation ST CIRCUS and the Tibetan 
rebellion in general.  This thesis examines the Tibetan resistance from multiple 
perspectives at the local level, and then from the broader regional and global context of 
the insurgency as well. 
 4 
1. Theoretical Literature: Principal-Agent Theory 
Principal-agent theory, also known as agency theory, offers theoretical insight 
into the motivations of various players in a contractual relationship, and helps answer the 
question of how one nation persuades another people to fight wars on its behalf.  In the 
past, other research focused on the application of economic models and game theory in 
the analysis of UW and insurgencies.8  However, economic models and game theory, on 
their own, fail to account for the moral hazard that is implicit in every contractual 
relationship or coalition in the case of UW.  The moral hazard, identified in principal-
agent theory and pervasive in UW, is when the local surrogate can take actions that affect 
the coalition's value to the global principal and the actions of the coalition parties cannot 
be efficiently monitored.9  The principal-agent model that I develop accounts for the 
moral hazard of a UW campaign by analyzing interest alignment, information symmetry, 
and risk acceptance among the global, regional, and local actors.   
In order to translate the economic and business principles of agency theory into 
UW, this study relies on sources that approach the topic from several perspectives.  
Works that cover the basic definitions and concepts of principal-agent theory establish 
the foundation of this research.  From this foundation, I examine literature that develops 
modeling applications of principal-agent theory.  I then build on this framework with 
relevant literature that applies agency theory to problems outside of business models, 
such as in international relations and foreign policy.  These applications of agency theory 
demonstrate the flexibility of the theory in general and demonstrate successful 
translations in other fields.   The application of risk is particularly important in this 
model.  Risk is fundamentally empirical in economic and business models; it becomes 
less exact in other applications.  However, it is a singularly important concept in agency 
theory and it must be successfully translated to UW for the model to stand.  The ultimate 
                                                 
8 S. J. Deitchman, ―A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare,‖ Operations Research 10, no. 6 
(December 1962): 818–827; William A. Niskanen, ―Review: The Economics of Insurgency,‖ Public 
Choice 9 (Fall 1970): 85–92; Richard Shultz, ―Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War: 
The Operationalization of the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare,‖ Journal of Peace 
Research 15, no. 2 (1978): 109–129. 
9 Bengt Holmstrom, ―Moral Hazard and Observability,‖ The Bell Journal of Economics 10, no. 1 
(Spring 1979): 74. 
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goal is not to develop an all-encompassing, yet artificially precise model, but rather 
demonstrate the applicability of conceptual relationships from agency theory into UW.  
Table 1 outlines the conceptual sources that I use and their relevance to this study. 
Table 1.   Theoretical Literature 
Author Relevance 
Basic Principal-Agent Theory 
Dowrick10 
A review of agency relationships in English law; significant discussion of extra-contractual 
agency relationships and the dynamics between principal and agent when no clear contract 
exists 
Eisenhardt11 Definitions and foundational principles of agency theory from a business perspective 
Holmstrom12 Discussion of how to improve a contractual relationship based on imperfect information 
Kreps13 Textbook on microeconomics with two chapters devoted to agency theory 
Strausz14 
Discussion of the dynamics involved in a principal-supervisor-agent relationship and the ability 




A model for designing reward structure based on maximizing both the principal's expected 
utility and principal's information on the agent's actions 
Zhou16 
A graphical model for analyzing a principal-agent problem and finding equilibrium points in the 
relationship 
Applied Principal-Agent Theory 
Braun17 Examination of principal-intermediary-agent relationships in international politics 
Kaen et al.18 
Discussion of historical American values as they relate to agency theory; concludes that agency 
theory can be applied outside of solely economic efficiencies 
Kiser19 An analysis of variations, strengths, and weaknesses of agency theory applied across 
                                                 
10 F. E. Dowrick, ―The Relationship of Principal and Agent,‖ The Modern Law Review 17, no. 1 
(January 1954): 24–40. 
11 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory.‖ 
12 Holmstrom, ―Moral Hazard and Observability.‖ 
13 Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. 
14 Roland Strausz, ―Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship,‖ The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99, no. 4 (December 1997): 497–518. 
15 Hao Zhang and Stefanos Zenios, ―A Dynamic Principal-agent Model with Hidden Information: 
Sequential Optimality through Truthful State Revelation,‖ Operations Research 56, no. 3 (June 2008): 
681–696. 
16 Xianming Zhou, ―A Graphical Approach to the Standard Principal-agent Model,‖ The Journal of 
Economic Education 33, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 265–276. 
17 Dietmar Braun, ―Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-agent Relations in Research 
Policy-Making,‖ Journal of Public Policy 13, no. 2 (June 1993): 135–162. 
18 Fred R. Kaen, Allen Kaufman, and Larry Zacharias, ―American Political Values and Agency 
Theory: A Perspective,‖ Journal of Business Ethics 7, no. 11 (November 1988): 805–820. 
19 Edgar Kiser, ―Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and 




economics, political science, and sociology 
Waterman and 
Meier20 
Examination of the validity of the information asymmetry and goal alignment assumptions in 
Principal-Agent Theory applied to political and bureaucratic situations 
Risk 
Alexander21 
A translation of classic works and ideas in security portfolio management into risk management 
theories 
Burton22 
Application of game theory and probability forecasting as guidelines for risk assessment in 
business 
Cather23 
A simple introduction to the models that demonstrate risk aversion and decision making in 
uncertain conditions 
Cox24 
Modeling examples of attacker-defender games with an emphasis on the mutually enforcing 
aspects of game theory and risk analysis 
Hausken25 
An analysis of the conditions under which actors in a situation incur costs in order to increase 
system reliability 
Insua, et al.26 
Examination of adversarial risk analysis and framework proposal for risk analysis in business 
and national defense 
Wade27 An introduction to game theory concepts for corporate risk management 
Zhao28 An optimization model for risk control measures when multiple risks are present 
2. Empirical Literature: The History of ST CIRCUS 
I evaluate the principal-agent model for UW by applying it to the case study of 
Operation ST CIRCUS.  As stated, the overall goal of this thesis is to provide a general 
framework for analyzing a UW campaign at the global, regional, and local levels.  
Operation ST CIRCUS meets this goal by providing a fresh case study that has been 
                                                 
20 Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, ―Principal-agent Models: An Expansion?‖ Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 8, no. 2 (April 1998): 173–202. 
21 Gordon J. Alexander, ―From Markowitz to Modern Risk Management,‖ European Journal of 
Finance 15, no. 5/6 (July 2009): 451–461. 
22 Richard M. Burton, ―System Instability, System Risk,‖ Physician Executive 29, no. 2 (March 2003): 
34. 
23 David A. Cather, ―A Gentle Introduction to Risk Aversion and Utility Theory,‖ Risk Management & 
Insurance Review 13, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 127–145. 
24 Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox Jr., ―Game Theory and Risk Analysis,‖ Risk Analysis: An International 
Journal 29, no. 8 (2009): 1062–1068. 
25 K. Hausken, ―Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory,‖ Risk Analysis: An International 
Journal 22, no. 1 (February 2002): 17–27. 
26 Insua Rios Insua, Jesus Rios, and David Banks, ―Adversarial Risk Analysis,‖ Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 104, no. 486 (June 2009): 841–854. 
27 Jared Wade, ―How You Play the Game,‖ Risk Management (00355593) 51, no. 4 (April 2004): 28–
32. 
28 Lindu Zhao and Yiping Jiang, ―A Game Theoretic Optimization Model Between Project Risk Set 
and Measure Set,‖ International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making 8, no. 4 
(December 2009): 769–786. 
 7 
subject to minimal prior analysis.  It was a long-running global campaign, and significant 
new bodies of information are becoming available on the topic.  While much has been 
written, for example, on the involvement of the CIA in support for the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, few are familiar with the intricacies of the Tibetan case.  
Furthermore, Operation ST CIRCUS lasted longer than the operation in Afghanistan and 
this longevity provides an appropriate level of variance in the conduct of the operation to 
allow for analysis.  Finally, new information on the operation is becoming available and 
this research intends to maximize the opportunity to examine newly illuminated primary 
source information.  These factors signal that Operation ST CIRCUS is an excellent case 
study for an analysis of global UW operations. 
A brief review of news reports, Internet information, and metropolitan bumper 
stickers reveals that the question of Tibetan independence is emotionally charged, with 
firmly entrenched camps on both sides of the issue.  One must anticipate and consider the 
strong potential for bias in any literature related to the subject.  In reading reviews of 
works, it also becomes apparent that even if an author attempts to take an unbiased 
approach to the issue, both sides are likely to accuse the author of bias.  While bias is not 
always a hindrance to the development of the knowledge base on the operation, I account 
for it by ensuring that divergent perspectives are adequately examined to gain a 
sufficiently developed frame of reference.29   
This research also examines the history of Tibet from geopolitical, regional, and 
local contexts to understand the most germane literature available for each of these 
categories.  Table 2 pinpoints key authors in Tibetan historical literature, and identifies 
their contextual focus and potential bias.  These are not the only authors that I use, but 
they provide the foundation of empirical evidence for this study.  These sources include 
the most informed authors and assist in achieving a well-rounded perspective.  For 
example, the two CIA team leaders in Operation ST CIRCUS, McCarthy and Knaus, 
have written books on the subject.  While one can consider them authoritative sources for 
                                                 
29 Dunham's Buddha's Warriors is an example of this.  While Dunham notes his close connection with 
Tibetan Buddhism early, it is this association that allows him unprecedented access to numerous key 
players in the Tibetan resistance. 
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information from the CIA perspective, other views are beneficial as well.  Dunham, a 
journalist, includes first-person narratives from many of the Tibetan guerillas, as well as 
the CIA in his work.  McGranahan, a university professor, provides a significant 
academic perspective as an anthropologist.  Taken as a whole, these sources prevent the 
development of bias in this research. 
Table 2.   Empirical Literature 
Author Context Bias 
Fairbank 30 Geopolitical; focus on Sino-U.S. Relations Neutral 
Burr and Kissinger31 
Kissinger32 
Geopolitical; focus on rapprochement between U.S. 
and China 
Neutral 
Foreign Relations of the United States33 
Geopolitical; primary source documents of regional 
and global diplomatic interaction 
Neutral 
Declassified Documents Reference System34 
Geopolitical; primary source documents of U.S. 
government reporting and analysis 
Neutral 
Ross, et al.35 Geopolitical Neutral 
Galbraith36 Regional China 
Xu37 Regional; Geopolitical Tibet 
Van Hollen38 Regional; Geopolitical Neutral 
Armstrong39 Regional China 
Ali40 Regional Neutral 
                                                 
30 John King Fairbank, The United States and China, Fourth Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983). 
31 William Burr and Henry Kissinger, The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing 
and Moscow (New York: New Press, 2000). 
32 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, 1st ed. (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1979). 
33 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1996). 
34 Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2011), 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS. 
35 Robert S. Ross et al., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002). 
36 Galbraith, A Life in Our Times; John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal 
Account of the Kennedy Years, 1st ed. (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1988). 
37 Guangqiu Xu, ―The United States and the Tibet Issue,‖ Asian Survey 37, no. 11 (November 1997): 
1062–1077. 
38 Christopher Van Hollen, ―The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia,‖ 
Asian Survey 20, no. 4 (April 1980): 339–361. 
39 J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine 
(University of California Press, 1980). 
40 S. Mahmud Ali, Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 1950s, 1st 
ed. (New York: Routledge Press, 1999). 
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Author Context Bias 
Goldstein41 Local; Regional China 
Smith Jr.42 Local; Regional; Leading Tibetologist Tibet 
Conboy and Morrison43 Local; Regional Tibet 
Dunham44 Local; Regional Tibet 
McCarthy45 Local; CIA Team Leader for initial stages Tibet 
Knaus46 Local; CIA Team Leader for latter stages Tibet 
McGranahan47 Local; focus on cultural factors Tibet 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The duration, scope, and conclusion of Operation ST CIRCUS provide ample 
material for applying an original model to the examination of UW.  To demonstrate the 
viability of this model, I compare the independent variables of interest alignment, 
information asymmetry, and risk preference with their impact on the dependent variable 
of campaign success.  I use a process-tracing methodology by comparing how the 
independent variables change over three discrete and distinct time periods, with how that 
affects the dependent variable.  In these three time periods, the benefits, and drawbacks, 
of the principal-agent relationship will be evident. 
                                                 
41 Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991); Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 
Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, 1st ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2009); Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, 1st ed. 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). 
42 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010). 
43 Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 2002). 
44 Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors. 
45 Roger E. McCarthy, Tears of the Lotus: Accounts of Tibetan Resistance to the Chinese Invasion, 
1950–1962 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006). 
46 John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America And The Tibetan Struggle For Survival 
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The three time periods reflect the development of the relationship between the 
CIA and the Tibetans, with certain key events marking the distinct end of one phase and 
the beginning of another.  The initial phase begins in the summer of 1956 when the Dalai 
Lama's48 older brother, Gyalo Thondup, made contact with CIA officers in India and 
plans were laid for the initial support of the newly formed Tibetan rebel alliance, the 
Chushi Gangdruk.49  The phase encompasses the initial training of Tibetan guerillas, and 
the beginning of airdrops of arms and equipment to the rebel fighters.  This phase ends in 
March of 1959, with the escape of the Dalai Lama to exile in India.50  The second phase 
continues from this time and ends in May 1965 with the final airdrop of equipment to the 
Tibetan guerillas.51  This period encompasses the largest number of successes for the 
Chushi Gangdruk, as well as significant political developments in the United States.  The 
final phase continues from 1965 and ends in 1974 when the Dalai Lama ordered the 
remaining resistance members to lay down their arms and take up the ―long term 
approach‖ to the Tibetan struggle.52  The summer of 1974 also saw the United States 
withdraw its final direct support for the Tibetans by ceasing covert payments to the 
Tibetan government in exile.53  The changing utility of local, regional, and global actors 
in each of these time periods provides sufficient variance to demonstrate the applicability 
of the principal-agent model for UW.  Furthermore, for each time period and each actor, I 
demonstrate the Chinese adversary's approach to manipulating utility in an effort to bring 
an end to support for the Tibetan resistance. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS/CHAPTER REVIEW 
This thesis is organized into two parts: model development and model application.  
In Chapter II, I develop the principal-agent model for unconventional warfare.  In this 
                                                 
48 All references to the Dalai Lama will be to the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
49 Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 138–139. 
50 McCarthy, Tears of the Lotus, 181–188. 
51 Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 279. 
52 As quoted in Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 302. 
53 Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 310. 
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chapter, I define the generic actors in an unconventional warfare campaign and examine 
their expected utility of the campaign in light of interest alignment, risk preference, and 
information symmetry.  I then finalize the model by showing the relationship between the 
coalition members' expected utilities and how these affect the outcome of an 
unconventional warfare campaign.  Finally, I show critical vulnerabilities in the coalition 
and how the adversary may exploit these to destabilize or defeat the coalition.  In Chapter 
III, I apply the model to Operation ST CIRCUS.  The case study chapter is divided into 
three sections corresponding to the three phases of the operation.  Each section examines 
the overall expected value and following actions of the three actors, as well as Chinese 
actions to manipulate each actor's expected utility.  In Chapter IV, I offer further case 
studies that could provide further testing of the model's validity as well as general 
implications for the future conduct of unconventional warfare. 
 12 
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II. PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL FOR UW 
In this chapter, I give a brief overview of Principal-Agent Theory and then 
explain the development of a principal-agent model that provides a framework for 
analysis of unconventional warfare campaigns.  The model begins with a two-party 
system and builds to a more comprehensive model that includes the principal, a local 
agent, a regional agent, and the adversary.  The model depends on a simple alignment of 
costs and benefits for each actor using many of the same elements found in agency 
problems in the business world.  In analyzing this alignment of costs and benefits, the 
model also presents opportunities for the adversary to identify potential vulnerabilities in 
the coalition he faces and to manipulate the utilities to destabilize or defeat the coalition.   
A. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY: AN OVERVIEW 
A principal-agent relationship begins when one actor, the principal, commissions 
work to be done, which for some reason he cannot, or prefers not, to do on his own.54  
The agent is the one asked to do the work.55  The contract that outlines the work to be 
done, and subsequent compensation, can be explicit (often in business scenarios) or 
implicit (as it might be in UW).56  In this contract, the principal seeks to minimize his 
costs, while gaining the maximum benefit from the work done in his interest.57  The 
agent seeks to minimize his effort in accomplishing the task in order to maximize his gain 
from the contract.58  Because the principal is not doing the actual work, he must either 
place complete faith in the agent to work according to the principal's interest, or incur 
some cost in incentivizing and monitoring the agent.59 
                                                 
54 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 58. 
55 Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, 579. 
56 Dowrick, ―The Relationship of Principal and Agent,‖ 25. 
57 Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, 580–581. 
58 Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, 580. 
59 John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, ―Principals and Agents: An Overview,‖ in Principals and 
Agents: The Structure of Business, ed. John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1991), 3. 
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The main costs come to the principal in terms of the incentive he provides the 
agent to act in the principal's interest.  The principal can provide ―outcome based‖ or 
―behavior based‖ rewards, or some combination thereof, for the agent's services.60  An 
outcome-based reward is seen in an auto mechanic's shop, where the mechanic is paid for 
a fixed car, regardless of how long it takes, or what he must do to fix it.  An outcome-
based reward compels the agent very strongly to work in the interests of the principal.61  
It also incurs significant risk on the agent's behalf, because circumstances outside the 
agent's control may significantly increase the difficulty of achieving the contracted 
outcome, but he is paid the same regardless.62  An hourly wage is an example of a 
behavior-based reward system.  If the principal has no means to monitor the work or 
progress of an agent that is paid by the hour, the agent has less incentive to work in full 
compliance with the principal's interests.63  In a behavior-based reward structure, the 
principal assumes greater risk, because of the costs incurred in monitoring the agent's 
behavior and the uncertainty of the outcome being in the principal's interest.64  Agency 
problems are generally resolved by adjusting compensation and information flow to 
minimize risk and uncertainty in executing the contract.65  This ensures interests remain 
aligned while carrying out the terms of the contract. 
The conduct of unconventional warfare presents a clear opportunity for the 
emergence of a moral hazard, or the ability of one party to conduct actions that affect the 
other party's value of the relationship.66  This possibility is clear as the definition of 
unconventional warfare according to United States military doctrine clearly identifies the 
UW as military operations ―predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or 
surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying 
                                                 
60 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 60. 
61 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 60. 
62 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 62. 
63 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 60. 
64 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 62. 
65 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 58. 
66 Holmstrom, ―Moral Hazard and Observability,‖ 74. 
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degrees by an external source.‖67  On a strategic level, the United States may choose to 
employ surrogate forces in order to avoid directly confronting an adversary with military 
force.  Because the United States is not directly involved in the conduct of operations, the 
cost of monitoring the surrogate to ensure effective use of resources can be extremely 
high.  Aligning interests, maintaining information symmetry, and sharing risk 
appropriately can mitigate this inefficiency and maintain a positive valuation of the 
relationship for all parties involved. 
B. FROM THEORY TO MODEL: THE FACTORS 
From a microeconomics perspective, the basic factors involved in agency theory 
modeling rapidly devolve into precise mathematical equations where appropriate 
monetary incentives usually provide an appropriate means for determining actors' 
preferred choices.68  However, modeling incentives in more nebulous subjects, such as 
unconventional warfare, is not precise, and cannot be made so.  Despite this apparent 
inability to reconcile the two subjects, other research has argued that agency theory ―is 
applicable in a variety of settings‖69 and that it ―can and should be broadened to include 
additional elements.‖70  The underlying concepts of agency theory can create a useful 
framework for analyzing behavior and outcomes in an unconventional warfare campaign. 
The most important component in the principal-agent relationship that applies to 
UW is interest alignment.  I define interest alignment as the expected value that the 
principal and agent assign to the campaign.  It is necessary to examine this expected 
value, because UW is not a love affair, it is warfare, and the tools for conducting warfare 
should be evaluated on their utility value, not their sentimental value.  When two parties 
agree to enter into a contract, or coalition, both have an overall expected value of that 
contract.  Each member's overall value is based on costs and benefits that each member 
expects to receive as party to the contract.  As long as each actor's expected value is 
                                                 
67 JP 1-02, 486. 
68 Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-agent Model 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. 
69 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 58. 
70 Kiser, ―Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory,‖ 150. 
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positive, it is in his interest to remain in the coalition.  If one member of the coalition sees 
his expected value turn negative, he can be expected to break from the coalition.  In 
unconventional warfare, this relationship begins with the global sponsor, or principal, and 
the insurgent, or local agent.  The basic model can be expanded to include a regional 
agent that has a cost-benefit based expected value as well.  The regional agent provides 
significant benefit to both parties in the conduct of the campaign, but can incur 
significant cost as well.  These three members of the UW coalition sit opposite of their 
adversary.  The overall relationship appears in Figure 1. I further describe their 
interaction in the next section. 
 
Figure 1.   Direct and Indirect Relationships in a UW Campaign71 
1. Developing the Framework: The Coalition's Interests 
The initial framework for analysis is a simple cost-benefit calculation.  Each party 
has a value (V) that is the difference between the benefits he expects to gain from the 
coalition (B) and the costs he expects to incur (C): 
V = B – C 
                                                 
71 I developed this figure as a visual representation of the relationships involved in a tripartite 
unconventional warfare coalition fomenting an insurgency against a common adversary. 
 17 
It is important to note, however, that each party expects different benefits, and incurs 
different costs.  The global principal places value in destabilizing or draining resources 
from the adversary.  He conducts UW as an economical alternative to traditional warfare, 
and his greatest costs are not necessarily material.  The principal's costs are most likely to 
be political.72  The agent is primarily concerned about the benefit of gaining his freedom, 
usually by ousting occupiers, or asserting territorial independence.  The agent's basic cost 
is high: survival.  The regional agent's benefits can be increased political influence in the 
region, and economic incentives from the other actors.  The regional agent faces the costs 
of the severity of the potential repercussions or retaliation from the UW adversary.  There 
is no universal checklist for potential costs and benefits, but the above serve as examples 
for the basic cost-benefit analysis for each actor.  
The model becomes more effective with the incorporation of uncertainty and the 
future effects of current actions.  While each party may have a relatively clear picture of 
present costs and benefits associated with his actions, the future effects of those actions 
are not as certain.  To account for this uncertainty, the model incorporates the terms of 
expected future benefits (EB) and expected future costs (EC) into the overall analysis.  
This creates an expected value output (EV): 
EV = (B – C) + (EB – EC) 
The expected benefit and expected cost both include not only the cost and benefit, but 
also the probability that the cost or benefit will be incurred.  Most decisions made in UW 
will be one-time decisions that cannot be duplicated to determine the odds of their output, 
as in rolling of a pair of dice.  The expectation of future costs and benefits is therefore 
based on a subjective probability that is determined through an analysis of the situation.  
The analysis of each actor's behavior will begin with the following basic questions: 
 Does the current benefit of this choice outweigh the current cost?  If not, is 
there an expected future benefit that outweighs the current cost? 
 What is the probability that the future benefit will be secured? 
                                                 
72 An example of this is the failed United States-supported invasion of Cuba by anti-Castroites in 
1961, known commonly as the Bay of Pigs Invasion.  By most accounts, it resulted in significant political 
embarrassment for the United States and the Kennedy administration. 
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 Does the current benefit of this choice outweigh the future cost?  If not, is 
there an expected future benefit that outweighs the future cost? 
 What is the probability that the future cost will be incurred? 
Each party is expected to make choices that keep his overall expected value positive, and 
to remain active in the coalition until the time where his expected value is negative.   
From a principal-agent framework, factors such as information symmetry and risk 
sharing impact the current and future cost-benefit calculations.  Information symmetry is 
the degree to which the principal has knowledge of the agent's actual actions.  With 
greater information on the ―ground truth‖ of an insurgent campaign, the principal reduces 
his risk and uncertainty.  However, increased information does not come without its 
costs.  To obtain increased information, the principal must dedicate resources and incur 
some cost.  For a local agent, information symmetry may be a cost or benefit.  However, 
the more information the principal has on the agent's actions, the more compelled the 
agent will be to act according to the principal's interests.73  The costs and benefits each 
actor incurs with relation to information symmetry are a significant factor in each actor's 
overall valuation of the coalition.     
Risk sharing also plays an important role in determining interest alignment.  Risk 
sharing is the degree to which potential costs are divided between the principal and agent.  
In unconventional warfare, it becomes the degree to which these potential costs are 
shared among the global principal, regional agent, and local agent.  These costs can have 
an affect on the overall expected value as well, and therefore impact the overall interest 
alignment.  In UW, the principal is interested in maintaining an outcome-based system, 
for without results, he does not achieve his desired outcomes.  This places the agent in a 
risk-averse position, but any effort from the principal to reduce, or share, the agent's risk, 
will therefore reduce the potential costs to the agent.  The sharing in risk will also 
increase the cost to the principal, and the principal may be unlikely to share in this risk 
without improved benefit from the agent's actions.  The regional agent may also incur 
 
 
                                                 
73 Eisenhardt, ―Agency Theory,‖ 60. 
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significant risk in providing support for the local agent's insurgency; there must be an 
offsetting benefit from either the principal or local agent for the regional agent to incur 
risk on behalf of either, or both, actors. 
Every action and decision the coalition makes results in different risks for each 
actor.  However, I evaluate each actor's approach to risk in a similar manner.  For the 
principal and the regional agent, the essential question is: Are the risks the actor chooses 
to share offset by a comparable increase in benefit (either current or future)?  An example 
of this would be if the global principal chose to increase his risk of political exposure by 
providing the agent high-tech weaponry that undeniably originated from the principal.  
This could result in the benefit of the local agent being more successful in disrupting the 
adversary; however, in providing this weaponry, the principal sacrifices plausible 
deniability of his sponsorship of the agent's insurgency.  For the local agent, the question 
is: how do the global principal and regional agent share in risk by diffusing potential 
costs to the local agent?  With insufficient support from the principal and regional agent 
due to risk aversion, the local agent faces the greatest potential cost: his survival.  
Without the benefits from shared risk, the local agent may be disinclined to act in 
accordance with the wishes of the principal. 
In sum, the framework for analysis includes an expected value equation for each 
actor.  The equation includes current and future costs and benefits.  From an agency 
theory perspective, information symmetry and risk sharing impact each actor's overall 
expected value.  So long as the expected values remain positive, interests in the coalition 
are aligned to a sufficient degree for the actors to pursue the UW campaign.  The 
adversary, however, can attack this framework on multiple levels to influence each actor's 
expected value and destabilize the coalition. 
2. Destroying the Framework: The Adversary's Options 
The coalition's adversary, facing an insurgency backed by an external sponsor, 
has several options available for destabilizing the coalition and defeating the insurgency.  
If the adversary understands the expected value equation that drives each coalition 
member's commitment to the campaign, then the adversary can manipulate the coalition 
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at the global, regional, and local level.  In facing the principal, the adversary's first 
priority is the principal's withdrawal of support for the local agent.  If the adversary can 
show how his internal stability would benefit the principal, the principal's expected value 
of the UW coalition would decrease, potentially drawing him out of the coalition.  In 
facing the local agent, the adversary can change the insurgent's utility of freedom.  If the 
adversary can demonstrate how inclusion in the adversary's state provides certain benefits 
that the agent would be unable to have while independent, the utility of freedom 
significantly diminishes.  This reduces the overall expected value by reducing the benefit 
in the equation.  The adversary can manipulate the regional agent's expected value in the 
same way with diplomatic pressure or the threat of all-out war influencing the regional 
agent's valuation of the UW coalition.  These are all examples of viable options for the 
adversary when evaluating a UW coalition from a principal-agent framework. 
C. FROM THEORY TO MODEL: THE ACTORS 
Principal-agent theory requires little translation for applicability in 
unconventional warfare.  An external sponsor, acting as the principal, forms a coalition 
with local and regional agents to conduct operations against a common adversary that the 
principal cannot conduct himself.  This section describes the actors and their relationships 
in more detail. 
1. The Global Principal 
In unconventional warfare, the external sponsor of the local insurgent plays the 
role of the principal in the principal-agent relationship.  Given that the principal's conflict 
with the adversary is at the geopolitical level, analysis of his actions are on the global 
level.  According to the doctrinal definition, unconventional warfare is conducted 
―through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces,‖74 making the one responsible for 
the orchestration of the operation a ―principal‖ in the relationship.  For a number of 
reasons the principal may believe that he should not directly confront his adversary, and 
instead chooses to find a willing agent to conduct ―guerrilla warfare, subversion, [and] 
                                                 
74 JP 1-02, 486. 
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sabotage‖75 against the adversary.  While this approach provides numerous advantages 
for the principal, agency theory details several factors that must be considered to maintain 
successful and efficient disruption of the adversary. 
The main problem that a principal faces is a lack of information as to what his 
agent is actually doing.  Almost all increases in information for the principal come at 
some increased cost or risk.  This is also the case in unconventional warfare.  The global 
principal cannot know what his agents are doing on the ground without being there 
himself, or expending resources dedicated to monitoring the agent.  These resources 
decrease the principal's overall utility in the operation by either increasing his overall risk 
or increasing the overall cost of the operation.  The risk can increase by having to employ 
monitors or advisors with the insurgents; the discovery of which could cause political 
embarrassment.  The cost could also increase by employing technical or other means to 
monitor the agent.  In the end, there must be some level of trust in the agent; or interests 
between the principal and agent must be aligned to the degree that the principal is 
confident that both parties seek to achieve the same goal.  
In Operation ST CIRCUS, the United States played the role of the principal.  The 
CIA seized on Tibetan unrest as an opportunity to destabilize the growth of communist 
China, and from 1956 to 1974 the United States, through the CIA, provided support to the 
Tibetan insurgents in the form of money, weapons, and training without ever having an 
American set foot inside Tibet.76  While it is clear that the United States never sought to 
fully overpower the PRC in Tibet, the lengthy relationship with the 
Tibetans and the significant resources employed to support their guerilla army, the 
Chushi Gangdruk, demonstrate that the United States had some interest in hampering 
Mao's expansion. 
2. The Local Agent 
The agent is the action arm in the principal-agent relationship.  The agent, 
because of his knowledge, position, or expertise, can conduct some type of work that the 
                                                 
75 JP 1-02, 486. 
76 Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors, 194. 
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principal is unwilling or unable to accomplish.  In unconventional warfare, the agent is 
the local insurgent group who has a common adversary with a global actor that is willing 
to sponsor the insurgency.  The agent is willing to confront his adversary, but recognizes 
significant benefit could be gained with external support for his movement.  However, if 
the insurgent perceives that a sponsor would hamper or complicate his struggle (i.e. the 
benefit gained would not outweigh the costs incurred), then the insurgent is unlikely to 
enter a principal-agent relationship with a global sponsor.77  This is not the only 
complication that can arise in the relationship; agency theory explains other factors that 
also arise. 
While the principal and agent may face the same adversary, their interests may 
not be the same.  The agent is likely most interested in gaining freedom from the 
adversary's oppression, or asserting territorial independence.  Meanwhile, the principal 
may be only interested in disrupting the adversary's expansion or causing the adversary to 
squander resources.  This discrepancy can lead to exploitation on both sides of the 
relationship.  The agent will be most compelled to act according to the principal's 
interests when the principal is willing to share risk to a sufficient degree that it improves 
the agent's future benefits to a point where they outweigh the costs incurred by 
conducting action on behalf of the principal. 
Tibetans were the local agent in Operation ST CIRCUS.  However, the Tibetans, 
like many insurgent groups, were not uniform in their approach to the communist 
Chinese.  The People's Liberation Army initially entered Tibet in September 1949, in 
response to the expulsion of all Chinese personnel from central Tibet after the PLA took 
Peking from the Chinese Nationalists.78  The Tibetan's initial reception of the PLA was 
lukewarm, and the Dalai Lama attempted to reconcile PRC desires for sovereignty with 
Tibetan desires for independence.79  The United States also examined legal ramifications 
for providing diplomatic support for the Tibetans on the basis of United States support for 
                                                 
77 An instance of insurgents rejecting sponsorship is reported to have happened earlier this year in 
Libya, see ―‗SAS unit‘ captured in Libya,‖ The Guardian, March 6, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/06/liam-fox-sas-unit-libya. 
78 Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation, 265. 
79 Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 19131951, 758. 
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―self-determination of peoples.‖80  However, an acceptable solution failed to emerge.  
Within a few years an organized militia dedicated to expelling the PLA began to form 
and it soon found CIA support.  In this analysis of Operation ST CIRCUS as a UW 
campaign, I specifically focus on the actions of the Chushi Gangdruk and associated 
militia groups in demonstrating the appropriateness of agency theory as a framework for 
unconventional warfare. 
3. The Regional Agent 
While basic principal-agent models do not normally include an intermediary, or 
regional agent, the role does exist and it is particularly germane to global UW campaigns.  
Business literature discusses intermediaries in terms of supervisors that are placed 
between principals and agents, as well as other intermediary roles, such as negotiators 
and mediation experts.81  In traditional principal-agent models, these intermediaries 
diffuse risk for both the principal and the agent by increasing information symmetry.  
This is accomplished by providing knowledge and expertise for the principal, as well as 
an avenue for verifying work that the agent has performed.82  However, problems can 
arise in the form of collusion between the agent and the intermediary.  The agent has 
incentive to conspire with the intermediary because the principal could use the 
intermediary's information to penalize the agent.83  While not a direct translation, this 
role and its inherent problems are evident in an unconventional warfare campaign. 
In unconventional warfare, the intermediary appears as a regional agent that is 
often used for access to the local agent and assistance in monitoring the local agent.  One 
essential note is that the regional agent is not always required as an intermediary between 
the principal, or sponsor, and the agent.  The principal may contact or conduct business 
directly with the agent, but a regional agent can provide distinct benefits for both the  
 
                                                 
80 ―Department of State to the British Embassy, 30 December 1950,‖ in Foreign Relations of the 
United States, vol. VI, 1950, 612, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1950v06. 
81 Braun, ―Who Governs Intermediary Agencies?‖ 
82 Braun, ―Who Governs Intermediary Agencies?‖ 140–141. 
83 Strausz, ―Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship,‖ 497. 
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principal and local agent.  All parties may benefit from the shared risk and improved 
information that an intermediary may provide; however, an intermediary also brings its 
own interests, which may complicate the relationship.  
In the case of Operation ST CIRCUS, India played a critical role as a regional 
actor in the principal agent relationship.  While India had some interest in leveraging 
power over China, President Nehru also sought to maintain amicable relations through 
his strategy of nonalignment in the Cold War.84  India's relationship with Tibet 
complicated these aims, although India maintained great interest in assisting the Tibetan 
people, and the international community largely regarded India as being in the best 
position to do so.85  Early on, India became the sanctuary of the Tibetan government in 
exile,86 and Nepal became the eventual sanctuary of the Chushi Gangdruk.87  While the 
relative importance of the regional agent's presence varied over the course of the 
campaign, its presence is significant enough that it merits analysis in terms of how the 
pursuit of its own interests, as well as risks it shared and information it provided, 
benefitted and harmed the overall UW campaign. 
4. The Adversary 
The adversary does not appear in principal-agent literature, but plays an important 
role in an unconventional warfare campaign.  In UW, the adversary is the target of the 
local agent and global sponsor, and can also be referred to as the counterinsurgent.  The 
adversary has interest in understanding the dynamics at play among the global sponsor, 
regional agent, and local agent, because these dynamics can be manipulated to destabilize 
the coalition and frustrate the goals of all three actors.  Against each actor, I evaluate the 
adversary's attempts to disrupt common interests, or change the  
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interests of particular actors, by increasing current and future costs, decreasing current 
and future benefits, increasing the probability of future costs, and decreasing the 
probability of future benefits. 
In the case of Operation ST CIRCUS, the People's Republic of China played the 
role of the adversary.  In rising as a communist state after World War II, China became a 
global adversary of the United States in the ―loss of China.‖88  China also clashed with 
newly independent India in a struggle for regional hegemony.89  At the local level, there 
is some evidence that Mao and the People's Liberation Army genuinely sought to 
improve the lot of the common Tibetan peasant, at least initially.90  However, with the 
imposition of certain agrarian reforms and the systematic destruction and degradation of 
the symbols of Tibetan Buddhism, many Tibetans turned against the Chinese, particularly 
those from the Kham and Amdo regions in Eastern Tibet.91  As unrest over China's 
perceived occupation grew across Tibet, coincident interests against the Chinese 
adversary rose among the United States, India, and the Tibetan people.  Throughout the 
course of Operation ST CIRCUS, China worked to manipulate each actor's cost-benefit 
analysis as a solution to its problem in Tibet. 
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89 Fairbank, The United States and China, 407. 
90 Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation, 273. 
91 Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors, 166–168. 
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III. CASE STUDY: OPERATION ST CIRCUS 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Tibet and Surrounding Areas92 
The question of Tibetan independence and territorial sovereignty has been 
complicated for more than 1,200 years.  From around 640 A.D. to 822, a collection of 
tribes in the Himalayan hills consolidated into a force large enough to compel Chinese 
recognition of the separate Tibetan empire.93  Through the Mongol period in the 
thirteenth century, a priest-patronage relationship was established between Tibetan lamas 
and the Mongol emperors.94  By the 1570s, Altan Khan, who controlled the Mongol 
borders to the west of the Ming dynasty, bestowed the honorific title of Dalai Lama on a 
Tibetan abbot, and demanded that all Mongols reject their shaman-based religions in 
favor of Tibetan Buddhism.95  In return for this, the abbot recognized Khan as the 
reincarnation of Phagspa, the teacher who had originally brought Buddhism to the 
                                                 
92 Martin von Wyss, ―Tibet Detail‖ (Richmond, Australia: vW Maps, 2005), 
http://www.vwmaps.com/tibetdetail.html.  Map copyright 2005, Martin von Wyss, vW Maps, Inc.  It is 
used with the expressed written permission of vW Maps.  This representation of Tibet is not intended to 
accurately depict current recognized or disputed international boundaries.  It is provided solely as a 
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Mongols.96  This bolstered Khan's legitimacy as a ruler among his own people, assured 
security along his southern border with the Tibetan tribes, and guaranteed the Tibetans 
independent recognition as autonomous from the Ming dynasty.  Over the next 400 years, 
various diplomatic missions reaffirmed the general internal autonomy of Tibet, while 
token respect was paid to China as a political benefactor.97  In 1876, the thirteenth Dalai 
Lama was born into the rise of Chinese nationalism and the meddling of Europe's Great 
Game.98  As the Chinese Republic overthrew the Ch'ing dynasty, Tibet declared its 
autonomy in October 1913, while entering into an agreement of nominal suzerainty under 
China (at the behest of the British, who were concerned about independent states making 
external alliances with Russia).99  During the next thirty years, through the rise of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and World War Two, Tibet maintained its de facto 
independence by travelling on its own passports and conducting its own diplomatic 
affairs.100  The CCP finally gained control in 1949 and set to the task of extending the 
revolution to what it considered all of Chinese territory.101  The PLA entered Tibet in 
1950, and soon set to the task of reinforcing communist influence, through schools and 
reeducation camps.102  The CCP also expanded its ability to influence by building and 
improving roads through Tibet.  While the Tibetans cautiously welcomed the new 
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The resistance, and the coalition behind it, began in 1956.  At this time, ―most 
Tibetans finally understood that the promises made by the Chinese were not worth even 
the breath used while talking or listening to them.‖103  Encouraged by signs of opposition 
to the Chinese, Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama, made contact with the 
CIA in Calcutta.  Together they developed plans to organize, train, and arm the 
burgeoning resistance movement in Tibet.104  As the relationship developed, it became 
known under the CIA cryptonym Operation ST CIRCUS, and continued until the final 
demobilization of the Tibetan guerilla army in 1974.105   
Significant developments throughout the course of American involvement in 
Tibet provide appropriate breaks in the timeline to analyze each actor's maneuvers during 
the conduct of the campaign.  The first phase begins with contact in 1956.  As Tibetans 
revolted in mass numbers against the unwelcomed Chinese reforms, the Dalai Lama fled 
from Lhasa into India in March 1959, as the PLA shelled his palace.106  The movement 
out of Tibet is a development that fundamentally changed the nature of the UW coalition.  
India now played a greater role as host of the Tibetan government in exile, and China 
significantly increased the scale and intensity of its military action.  The movement to 
exile ended the early years of the coalition and ushered in the second phase.  During the 
second phase, the CIA increased support for the Tibetan movement, to include a guerilla 
warfare training program in the Colorado Rockies, and dozens of air drops of arms and 
ammunition.  By 1965, however, the arms drops and training efforts ceased.  While 
monetary support still continued, the cessation of active arming and training the Chushi 
Gangdruk marked the start of the third and final phase of the campaign.  From this point 
forward, interests among the coalition members became increasingly at odds with each 
other, eventually leading the United States to drop its support for both the Chushi 
Gangdruk and the Tibetan government in exile.  Table 3 provides a summary of expected 
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value for each actor throughout the operation, and brief notes on the Chinese actions 
against each coalition member.  In the table, the current and expected costs and benefits 
are described in terms of ―high‖ and ―low,‖ and ―growing,‖ ―stable,‖ and ―falling.‖  
―High‖ and ―low‖ refer to the relative value of the costs and benefits.  ―Growing,‖ 
―stable,‖ and ―falling‖ refer to the perceived trend in the cost or benefit over the next 
period.  For example, if the actor sees conditions improving in the future, the cost could 
be falling, or the benefit rising, or both.  Empirical evidence and analysis to support the 
chart follows in the story of Operation ST CIRCUS. 
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Table 3.   UW Principal-Agent Analysis: Operation ST CIRCUS 
 
Level/Time Early (1956-1959) Middle (1959-1965) Late (1965-1974) 
Local Agent: 
Tibet 
Overall EV: (High, Growing) 
Current Costs: (High, Stable) 
Current Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Expected Costs: (Low, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Results: Significant gains made against PLA; 
Greatest growth and most effective attacks 
Overall EV: (High, Growing) 
Current Costs: (High, Growing) 
Current Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Expected Costs: (High, Stable) 
Expected Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Results: Mixed tactical success; relocated to 
Mustang 
Overall EV: (High, Falling) 
Current Costs: (High, Growing) 
Current Benefits: (High, Falling) 
Expected Costs: (Low, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (High, Falling) 
Results: Final small band of fighters surrendered 
to Nepal at the request of the Dalai Lama 
Global Principal: 
United States 
Overall EV: (High, Growing) 
Current Costs: (Low, Stable) 
Current Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Expected Costs: (Low, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Results: CIA began funding, training, and 
equipping Tibetan insurgents; Mao forced to 
commit resources to Tibet 
Overall EV: (High, Stable) 
Current Costs: (Low, Growing) 
Current Benefits: (High, Stable) 
Expected Costs: (Low, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (High, Stable) 
Results: Increased supply drops; Mao forced to 
commit even more resources to Tibet 
Overall EV: (Low, Falling) 
Current Costs: (High, Growing) 
Current Benefits: (High, Falling) 
Expected Costs: (High, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (Low, Falling) 
Results: US withdrew support for Tibet and 
pursued normalized relations with China 
Regional Agent: 
India 
Overall EV: (Low, Growing) 
Current Costs: (Low, Stable) 
Current Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Expected Costs: (Low, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (High, Growing) 
Results: India provided meeting place for CIA and 
Tibetans; sanctuary for Dalai Lama 
Overall EV: (High, Stable) 
Current Costs: (High, Growing) 
Current Benefits: (High, Stable) 
Expected Costs: (High, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (Low, Falling) 
Results: Tibet allowed to establish gov't in exile in 
India and guerilla base in Nepal 
Overall EV: (Low, Falling) 
Current Costs: (High, Growing) 
Current Benefits: (Low, Falling) 
Expected Costs: (High, Growing) 
Expected Benefits: (Low, Falling) 
Results: Gov't in exile allowed to remain; rebel 
base chased out of Nepal 
Adversary: 
China 
Vs. Global: Statements against ―imperialist 
meddling‖ 
Vs. Regional: Statements against ―imperialist 
meddling‖ 
Vs. Local: Increased PLA presence and activity; 
Increased political pressure on Tibetan elite 
Vs. Global: Began support for Vietnam; avoided 
direct confrontation 
Vs. Regional: War with India '62 
Vs. Local: Thamzing introduced in Lhasa; 
relocation of Han Chinese into Tibet 
Vs. Global: Increased activity in Vietnam; 
invitation to Beijing 
Vs. Regional: Nuclear weapon test; Cultural 
Revolution 
Vs. Local: Cultural Revolution and Red Guards; 
re-entry incentives 
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A. THE EARLY YEARS: CONTACT TO EXILE, 1956–1959 
In the first years of the coalition between the United States, Tibet, and India, it is 
clear that interests became aligned according to the principal-agent model and all actors 
expected increasing benefits from disrupting the PRC consolidation of control along its 
southwestern border.  However, the United States had much to learn about the region and 
the actors it would encounter.  The United States at the time was fervently anti-
communist and clearly saw the world engaged in a bilateral zero-sum game where any 
communist gains would result in ground lost to freedom and democracy.  Tibet was 
emerging from a period of appeasement with the Chinese Communists, shaking the 
naïveté that the PRC would allow for the internal autonomy traditionally enjoyed in the 
Tibetan highlands.  India, newly independent from the British throne, sought to maintain 
a cordial relationship with both China and the United States, while also expanding 
influence in the region.  It was during this period that the thinnest strands of contact 
between the United States and Tibet were mutually expanded and strengthened as both 
sides began to see the mutual benefit in pursuing military action against the Chinese. 
1. Local Agent: Tibet 
Tibet reached 1956 at a crossroads.  By numerous accounts, the Dalai Lama's 
1955 meetings with Mao in Beijing led him to trust that PRC development, supervised by 
the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART), would benefit 
the underdeveloped Tibetan countryside.107  However, Mao had also indicated the PRC's 
intentions to eradicate Tibetan Buddhism, which he had described to the Dalai Lama as a 
poison.108  In travelling back from Beijing to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama's interactions with 
his countrymen along the route confirmed these indications.  Atheism was taught in 
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Chinese-run schools,109 and despite Tibetans reciting the mandatory approval of Chinese 
communism, the Tibetan leader ―saw tears in their eyes.‖110  He also heard talk of an 
independence movement for the first time.111  The potential costs of inaction were high, 
and ignoring the Chinese presence was not an option.  At the same time, the costs of 
action against the Chinese were low, although they could be expected to rise as the 
Chinese retaliated.  The present benefits, however, were relatively high, and while the 
probability of future benefits was low, the utility that the Tibetans tied to their freedom 
was great and they were willing to fight for it.  
A significant strategic benefit that the Tibetans gained during this period also led 
to an operational-level benefit.  On a global scale, by demonstrating that they were 
capable, to some degree, of organizing and resisting the Chinese militarily, the Tibetans 
gained the attention of the United States as a global sponsor.  This global sponsorship at 
the strategic level led to the operational benefit of receiving arms and training from the 
CIA.  The project began in February 1957 with six Tibetans from the Chushi Gangdruk 
being exfiltrated from Tibet through East Pakistan and flown to Saipan for training in 
guerilla warfare techniques.112  The benefits grew as more Tibetans were trained under 
Operation ST CIRCUS.  The training moved from Saipan to Camp Peary, Virginia, and 
the CIA eventually selected a former United States Army base, Camp Hale, in the 
mountains just north of Leadville, Colorado, as a suitable place to train the Tibetans.113  
Complementing the training operations came the first drops of weapons and equipment 
inside of Tibet.  Roger McCarthy, the first CIA team leader for Operation ST CIRCUS, 
estimated a ―minimum of 550,000 to nearly 800,000 pounds of material being parachuted 
to the Volunteers‖ by the beginning of 1959.114  This is a significant benefit, especially 
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considering the logistical challenges in coordinating clandestine airdrops over remote, 
high-altitude, unmapped terrain.115  A final benefit emerged during this period as the 
Chushi Gangdruk achieved several notable military victories over a surprised PLA.  The 
garrisons of the PLA were destroyed in many areas of eastern Tibet and the Tibetans 
exacted serious casualties on the PLA.116  This period saw the height of Chushi 
Gangdruk activity and successes against the PLA and served hope that the resistance 
might actually be successful.  
The end of the early years was precipitated by the flight of the Dalai Lama into 
exile in India.  This was one of the greatest benefits the Tibetans received out of this era.  
The Dalai Lama was able to safely escape just as the Chinese began shelling his 
palace.117  Chushi Gangdruk soldiers, who had been trained in Saipan, were able to 
escort their spiritual leader while providing clandestine radio updates on his movements 
to the United States.  These radio calls allowed for diplomatic coordination of his 
reception in India without alerting the Chinese to his whereabouts.118  One guerilla 
fighter from Lithang stated with pride that the fighters' ―most important achievement was 
that [they] were able to provide security to His Holiness the Dalai Lama during his flight 
from Tibet.‖119  This was not only a present benefit for the Tibetans, but a future 
expected benefit as well.  With the Tibetan government in exile safely established in 
India, the Tibetans were much closer to the international stage they needed to attract 
support for their cause, and their spiritual and temporal leader was safe from harm. 
The costs borne by the Tibetans in the early stages of the campaign are best seen 
at the tactical and strategic levels of the conflict.  From a tactical level, the immediate 
costs were intensely apparent.  Early armed resistance to the Chinese began among 
nomadic tribesman in eastern Tibet known as the Goloks after the Chinese attempted to 
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confiscate their arms.120  The Department of State received a report that a force of about 
8,000 Goloks was able to inflict as many as 900 Chinese casualties, although the exact 
numbers were unclear due to conflicting reports.121  This attack on a garrison of Chinese 
soldiers prompted brutal PLA retaliation, burning villages and monasteries in the Golok 
areas to the ground.122   
There were many other spontaneous and unrelated uprisings at the same time 
throughout eastern Tibet, particularly among the Kham and Amdo tribesman.123  The 
PLA did what it could to control the violence, but one particular costly incident to the 
Tibetans became the flashpoint for unification of the disparate resistance movements.  In 
1956, the PLA attempted to arrest a group of high-ranking lamas from the Lithang 
monastery during a religious ceremony.124  A showdown ensued where the local Tibetans 
rushed to support Lithang while the PLA effectively besieged the monastery.  Under the 
guise of surrender, a well-respected monk, Yuri Ponpo, requested audience with the PLA 
general officer overseeing the siege.  Ponpo shot and killed the general in front of the 
general's entire staff.  This prompted not only Ponpo's death, but the PLA then bombed 
the monastery and all inside of it, resulting in several thousand Tibetans killed, and the 
largest monastery in eastern Tibet completely destroyed.125  While the cost was high, 
Lithang became the unifying point for the various resistance movements and the flash 
point around which the Kham, Amdo, and Golok tribes would coalesce to form the 
Chushi Gangdruk resistance army.126   
Despite this high cost in human life, the Tibetans had an overall positive expected 
value in continuing the struggle against the PLA with the help of the United States and 
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India during this period.  Although the initial reaction of the PLA in Lithang imposed a 
high price, it also solidified popular support for resistance against the Chinese.  
Furthermore, the early training the Tibetans received improved the expected future 
benefits by ensuring their ability to fight the Chinese invasion would advance.  
Additionally, there is significant documentation of abuses that the Tibetans suffered at 
the hands of Chinese ―democratic reform,‖ even before the widespread resistance, 
suggesting that many of the costs would have been incurred, even in the absence of an 
armed resistance.127  I assess that during this period, the Tibetans' overall expected value 
was high and growing, although the costs were growing as well. 
2. Global Principal: The United States 
In the early phase of the campaign, the United States gained little immediate 
benefit, but also incurred little cost.  However, the future benefits the United States 
expected to gain from the groundwork laid in this period were significant and the 
probability the benefits would be achieved was also high. 
The United States recognized great strategic benefit in the ability of the Tibetans 
to continue an armed resistance against the communist Chinese.  The support for the 
resistance movement, though minimal, was an opportunity to thwart China's increasing 
influence around the globe.  One American official from the Operations Coordinating 
Board128 described the Tibetan actions during this time as a ―windfall for the U.S., 
particularly since it tends to harden Asian neutralist sentiment against the Chicoms.‖129  
While fostering the resistance was recognized as beneficial for the United States, the 
CIA's 1959 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on China recognized that ―it [was] 
doubtful that resistance forces will have the leadership, organization, weapons, and food 
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supplies to mount more than scattered guerilla operations.‖130  However, by the end of 
this period, the CIA also assessed that the Tibetan revolt was partially responsible for 
―tarnishing the carefully cultivated image of Communist China as a peaceful, reasonable, 
and tolerant nation.‖131  This is a clear demonstration of the convergence of Tibetan and 
American interests, as both parties valued armed resistance to the Chinese occupation of 
Tibet, albeit for different reasons. 
The United States strategy also gained the operational benefit of drawing more 
PLA forces into fighting the Tibetan insurgency.  Chinese military forces increased in 
Tibet from a 30,000-member advance guard in 1950, to eight divisions containing over 
150,000 PLA soldiers by 1958.132  Although this was only about five percent of the 
PLA's overall estimated strength in 1958,133 it still represented a ―serious harassment to 
the Chinese Communists,‖ according to the Secretary of State, Christian Herter.134  The 
benefits to the United States at this time in the operation were positive, and the overall 
expected benefits could only be increasing as long as the Tibetans were able to keep up 
the fight.  
Meanwhile, the costs at this time for the United States were very low.  At the 
strategic level, the United States mitigated the risk of exposure and maintained plausible 
deniability of support by hiring Polish pilots to fly unmarked aircraft in the flights over 
Tibet.135  The CIA also supplied the Chushi Gangdruk with British Lee-Enfield rifles that 
were common in the region and would not be able to cause political embarrassment to the 
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United States.136  All meetings between Tibetans and Americans were held secretly in 
India or the United States, and all public interaction adhered to strict diplomatic 
protocols.137  Operational level costs were also minimal, as the training conducted in 
Saipan and Colorado required minimal personnel and resources.  The greatest investment, 
in terms of cost, were the air operations supporting the infiltration of Tibetan guerillas 
back into Tibet and their subsequent resupply flights, although this cost was still 
negligible in relation to the benefit gained. 
By 1959, the United States had a clearly positive utility that it could expect by 
promoting the Tibetan rebellion.  It was clear the Tibetans were willing to fight the 
Chinese, and that the Chinese were willing to expend resources in maintaining authority 
over Tibet.  This was a fundamental expected benefit for the United States, which far 
outweighed the minimal costs it expected to incur as a sponsor. 
3. Regional Agent: India 
In the early years, the regional actor played a significant, though not dominant, 
role in the establishment of the Tibetan rebellion.  The interest calculations of India, vis-
à-vis China, offer significant insight into its actions during this time.  While India did not 
gain much in the establishment of covert and clandestine support for the budding Tibetan 
insurgency, it had the expectation of significant future benefit from the action. 
The most significant strategic benefit for India was the maintenance of a buffer 
zone along its northeastern border.138  In essence, India preferred to watch the Tibetans 
fight China over disputed territory than to settle disputed borders itself.  India also placed 
a high priority on a friendly relationship with China and maneuvered to maintain that 
relationship.  In short, as long as India could maintain a façade of minimal, support for 
the Tibetans, and the Tibetans kept up the fight against China, then India's expected 
benefits would be high.  Conversely, the costs remained low.  India did run the risk of 
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upsetting China and provoking retaliation if it were to be seen as providing excessive 
support for the Tibetan cause, but mitigated the strategic risk through diplomatic 
maneuvers and passive, deniable support.  For example, the United Nations saw India as 
the primary candidate for advancing the Tibetan cause, but India refused to do this 
several times on the grounds that it recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet.139  On 
another practical front, India also refused to allow the CIA to train Tibetan guerillas in 
Indian territory, prompting the CIA to look elsewhere.140  During this period, India had a 
positive expected value through gaining a buffer on its border at minimal cost. 
4. The Adversary: China 
China was clearly caught off-guard in the early years of the Tibetan rebellion.141  
During the first five years of occupation in Tibet, the PLA experienced minor resistance, 
and Tibetan leadership appeared willing to explore the concept of internal autonomy 
under Chinese suzerainty.  Early in the occupation, China had secured a seventeen-point 
agreement detailing this arrangement.142  The violent uprisings of the Goloks and Kham 
in eastern Tibet, however, indicated that the incorporation of Tibetan regions into the 
PRC would not be easily won.  During the early years of the uprising, China responded in 
some manner to all three elements of the coalition lined up against it in an attempt to 
thwart the cost-benefit analysis of each actor. 
Initially, the Chinese arrived to Tibet as a welcome respite from the poorly 
resourced Koumintang, who had resorted to extortion and bullying the population before 
losing the Chinese civil war to the communists.143  At the outset, the PLA had come 
bearing gifts and paying for everything they took.144  A popular Tibetan refrain at the 
time referred to the Chinese as ―kind parents,‖ whose ―silver dollars [were] raining 
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down‖ on the Tibetans.145  However, this reward-based method of winning the 
population was not able to compensate for the Tibetans' perceived losses in the Chinese 
―democratization‖ of their traditional power structures, which were largely based on the 
Tibetan religion.146  The Tibetans resisted many of these ―democratic reforms,‖ and the 
carrots soon turned to sticks. 
As noted above, there were military reprisals against the Tibetan uprising; 
however, there were also political costs and coercive methods employed as well.  One 
State Department report noted that the ―Chinese Communists apparently [were] having 
some success in inducing Tibetans remaining in Lhasa to identify themselves with the 
regime.‖147  By wooing members of Tibet's political elite, China was able to stave off a 
wholly unified resistance movement during the early years of the revolt.148  The Dalai 
Lama's flight to India, however, would draw a line in the sand separating those Tibetans 
willing to resist Chinese occupation and those willing to comply with the communists. 
By the time the Dalai Lama had fled into exile, China had a much better 
appreciation for the problem it faced.  India, though outwardly neutral, provided 
sanctuary to the insurgency fighting China.  China also recognized ―imperialist‖ 
meddling in the Tibetan army it faced.149  While China did not yet have smoking gun 
evidence of the United States' involvement, it would soon begin to apply pressure to the 
United States in an effort to focus American interests elsewhere. 
B. THE MIDDLE YEARS: EXILE TO BREAKUP, 1959–1965 
During the middle years of the operation, a divergence in benefits to each actor 
began to emerge.  The United States clearly saw increased value in the operation for a 
time, but fighting became much more costly for the Tibetans.  Shortly after the Dalai 
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Lama fled, the Chushi Gangdruk also moved out of Tibet into the Mustang region of 
Nepal in order to reconstitute in sanctuary.150  India and Nepal both had to weigh the cost 
of confrontation with China over the Tibet issue.  Meanwhile, the United States faced a 
growing concern over the spread of communist influence in South Vietnam.  These 
factors all contributed to the actors' expected values beginning to stray apart from each 
other, although by 1965, all actors still maintained a positive expected value and 
remained in the coalition together. 
1. Local Agent: Tibet 
Beginning in April of 1959, the Tibetans continued to see a positive expected 
value in continuing their resistance; however, the future prospects were not as bright.  
The benefits they received from the United States were growing in terms of training and 
equipment, although it was never quite enough.  Similarly, India allowed the exile 
government to establish itself in Dharamsala, but still refused international support and 
recognition in deference to China.  Their costs were also rising.  The Chushi Gangdruk 
no longer enjoyed battlefield dominance over the PLA; and the PLA was able to 
regenerate much more easily after battlefield losses.  The benefits still outweighed the 
costs, but not nearly as much as they had in the past five years. 
The Tibetans continued to receive the benefit of training and material support 
while establishing their guerilla bases in Mustang, but it would not last long.  Support to 
the Tibetans had reached a lull after the dramatic exile of the Dalai Lama, but soon 
resumed under President Kennedy's hand in March 1961.  The first aerial supply in 
support of the Mustang bases consisted of over 29,000 pounds of arms and ammunition, 
as well as seven Khampa leaders who had successfully completed training at Camp 
Hale.151  Another large drop soon followed in early April.  However, a series of 
American political maneuvers brought the drops and training to another halt until Tibet 
found a new friend in India. 
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Nehru's strategy of appeasement with China demonstrated its futility in October 
1962 when tens of thousands of PLA soldiers moved to secure a contested border area 
between PRC-occupied Tibet and India.152  India suddenly needed an anti-Chinese force 
in its northern border area, and was more than happy to facilitate the re-invigoration of 
American support for the Tibetan guerillas.153  Camp Hale reopened with 125 new 
trainees and airdrops resumed to the Mustang bases.154  The CIA even arranged for eight 
Tibetans to attend Cornell and Georgetown universities.155  This renewed interest 
maintained a high level of benefit for the Tibetans, and gave them hope to continue the 
fight. 
Despite the rising benefits, the costs, both present and expected, began to rise at 
this time for the Tibetans.  The majority of atrocities committed against the Tibetan 
population from 1954 to 1959 had been in the eastern parts of the country against the 
restive Kham, Golok, and Amdo tribes.  By 1959, however, brutal repression had spread 
even to Lhasa, as the Chinese blamed what was left of the Tibetan government for its 
inability to control the Khampa rebellion.  The most noted example of this is the practice 
of thamzing, essentially public confession and humiliation, often accompanied by torture 
and execution, that had been common in the east, but was first introduced in Lhasa at this 
time.156  The Chinese also stepped up their systematic destruction of Tibetan Buddhism 
as well.  Before 1959, over 6,000 monasteries stood in Tibet proper, after 1960, only 370 
remained open.157  Despite these measures, the Tibetans continued to see value in 
resistance, with the assistance of the United States and passive support from India. 
2. Global Principal: The United States 
Although Tibetan prospects were dimming, the United States saw this time as its 
greatest period of benefit from the operation.  The greatest benefit the United States 
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received during this time came in the form of a strategic intelligence windfall.  The CIA 
had become frustrated with the slow pace of tactical operations coming from Mustang, 
and the Tibetans were pressured to document the fruits of their labor.158  Determined to 
prove his force's capabilities, the Mustang commander, Baba Gen Yeshi, planned an 
ambush along a road connecting PLA border positions in late October 1961.159  Although 
the photographer documenting the ambush forgot to remove his lens cap, and only four 
Chinese were killed in the ambush, a larger prize was found in the front seat.  The 
Tibetans captured a leather satchel containing over 1,600 pages of top-secret classified 
documents from the highest levels of the PLA.160  The documents were flown 
immediately to Washington, D.C. for analysis.  Remarking on the documents, Tibetan 
Task Force team leader, Roger McCarthy noted, ―Especially impressive were the bullet 
holes through some of the documents as well as blood smeared on them.‖161  The benefit 
was beyond their appearance.   
The United States found immense value in these bloodstained documents.  
Offering an ―unparalleled basis for evaluating recent conditions within the People's 
Liberation Army,‖ the documents provided details and insight on many unseen aspects of 
the PLA.  The United States learned details on the PRC's general military posture, 
revealing deception campaigns that had led the United States to an inflated estimate of 
PLA strength.  The documents disclosed China's nuclear capabilities and intentions, as 
well as information on disintegrating relations and support from the Soviet Union.162  
The United States intelligence community also found great value in the revelations of 
―basic Chinese Communist attitudes‖ and the ―propaganda and indoctrination‖ that was 
prepared for PLA field grade officers.163  One of the greatest benefits, however, was that 
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the PRC was unaware of the United States having the documents until late 1963, when 
the CIA required translation assistance from Stanford University.164   
This trove of current, accurate, and untainted intelligence on the heavily shrouded 
PRC, was by far the greatest benefit that the United States received during the conduct of 
Operation ST CIRCUS, and clearly demonstrates how interests can be aligned between a 
principal and agent, even though end state goals may be different.  The two actors' 
divergent recollections of the event demonstrate the wide variance in the value they 
placed on it.  The CIA considered the intelligence coup so invaluable, that in 2009, the 
agency commissioned a painting memorializing the incident to be hung in its Intelligence 
Art Gallery.165  However, subsequent interviews of Tibetan fighters, who were actually 
involved in the capture of the documents, reveal that many placed no value on the 
documents at all, and many didn't even recall the specific incident where the documents 
were captured.166   
Beyond strategic gains, the United States also achieved some operational benefits 
through this phase of the operation.  The Air Force had just unveiled its new theater lift 
aircraft, the Hercules C-130A, which was functional, but largely untested.  Air Force 
pilots working with the CIA's covert Civil Air Transport, in support of Operation ST 
CIRCUS, were able to test and improve the design of the C-130.  By experimenting with 
different internal configurations, the Air Force officers were able to double the payload 
from 12,000 pounds to almost 25,000 pounds, and then confirm that capability by flying 
the loads over the most formidable terrain in the world.167  These practical strategic and 
operational benefits the United States gained continued to outweigh the minimal 
investment required in the operation.  
The United States began to assume more risk as well, which caused a rise in 
probability of incurring future costs.  By this time, the Polish pilots and deniable C-118 
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aircraft were abandoned in favor of the C-130A and American pilots from an Air Force 
special missions squadron that was forward staged in Okinawa.168  When American U2 
pilot Gary Powers had been captured in the Soviet Union in 1960, American flights into 
Tibet and all other communist air space were brought to a temporary halt, but they soon 
resumed after the Tibetans proved their utility by capturing the satchel of Chinese 
intelligence.169 
Both the present and future expected costs went up as the United States assumed 
more risk in the operation.  At the strategic level, President Kennedy had installed John 
Kenneth Galbraith, noted economist and Harvard professor, as the new ambassador to 
India in March 1961.  Upon assuming his post, Galbraith was ―especially disturbed‖ by 
Operation ST CIRCUS, and described it as a ―particularly insane enterprise.‖170  He 
assessed that ―most of the projects proposed would be useless for their own anti-
communist purposes and were capable, when known, of doing [the United States] great 
damage as well.‖171  Of particular concern to him was a repeat of the Soviet U-2 incident 
and how it might hamper his diplomatic mission.172  Ambassador Galbraith then 
undertook a concerted effort, involving personal correspondence with President Kennedy, 
to bring ―all clandestine operations in India of all kinds to an end.‖173  While he was 
somewhat successful in his undertaking, President Kennedy still regarded the Tibetans as 
a viable means to continue needling the communist bloc after the CIA's disaster in the 
Cuban Bay of Pigs operation.174  The Tibetan assistance would continue, but hampered, 
as the cost associated with being discovered was now assessed to be much higher. 
Between the immense current strategic benefit and the assessed potential cost 
involved, the overall expected value to the United States still remained high.  However, 
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the future prospects were no longer as great as they were in the previous period.  To 
maintain the present benefit, the Tibetans would have to continue to capture useful 
strategic intelligence for the United States, which was not an easy task to plan or execute. 
3. Regional Agent: India 
Although the regional actor's overall expected value rose quickly, it also fell very 
quickly, but during this period there was still benefit to be gained from the Tibetan 
resistance.  India's value of the Tibetans increased immensely in October 1962, as India 
and China's long-running border disagreement came to a boil.  There had been diplomatic 
disagreements in the past, but China now blamed India for having ―not only aided and 
abetted [the Tibetan] rebellion,‖ and also giving ―refuge to the remnant rebels after the 
rebellion had been put down, and connived in their anti-Chinese political activities.‖175  
In one month, the Chinese dealt a devastating military defeat to India and gained 
possession of both pieces of disputed area, India's Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), 
and the Aksai Chin region, although China ―magnanimously‖ returned the NEFA to 
India.176  During this incident, India reached out to the United States for military 
assistance.177  In addition to significant airlifts of military aid, the United States, via 
Roger McCarthy, also recommended the use of Tibetan guerillas as a disruption force 
against the PLA across the border.178  Although there was not time to use them in the 
border war, India recognized that its days of brotherhood with China were over, and soon 
set to organizing, training, and equipping Tibetan refugees as India's newest army unit, 
the Special Frontier Force (SFF).179 
India's interest in benefiting from the Tibetan's willingness to fight the PLA 
increased the benefits to the United States and Tibet as well.  Although the program was 
kept very quiet, the United States no longer had to entertain Ambassador Galbraith's 
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concerns over diplomatic fallout with India for supporting the Tibetans.180 As many as 
12,000 Tibetans were now able to join the Indian Army and receive a regular 
paycheck.181  Separate from the SFF, the CIA continued training and supplying the 
Chushi Gangdruk in Mustang, and integrated them as a deep reconnaissance force inside 
Chinese-occupied Tibet.182  The combined military and paramilitary force became a 
significant asset for India, which was employed several times over the ensuing decades, 
earning a significant reputation for valor.183 
Through this period, India paid a significant price in its relationship with China 
for having provided passive support to the Tibetans.  However, in the Special Frontier 
Force, it also gained a significant capability that would serve it well for several years in 
several conflicts.  Overall, India maintained a positive expected value, but the future costs 
of strained relationships with China would only continue to grow. 
4. The Adversary: China 
During this period, the Chinese continued to increase pressure on the Tibetan 
people, focusing more on cultural domination than military domination.  The Chinese 
faced a balancing act in the face of changing relations between the United States and 
Soviet Union.184  India was dealt with directly during the border conflict in 1962 as a 
move to establish Chinese dominance in the region. 
The Chinese practice of thamzing was one particularly effective approach to 
breaking down the Tibetan societies will to resist.  The public confessions often had 
                                                 
180 Conboy and Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, 181; The Pentagon also attempted to get 
involved with an Army Special Forces training detachment for the SFF, but it was determined to be too 
large of a signature of American involvement, see Robert W. Komer, ―Memorandum From Robert W. 
Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 16 February 1963,‖ in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XIX (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1996), 494. 
181 Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 272. 
182 Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 274–275. 
183 Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors, 385–386; Conboy and Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, 
257–258. 
184 Baijia Zhang, ―The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 
1954–1970,‖ in Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 60. 
 48 
children turning in their parents and neighbors turning against neighbors.  The practice 
also often required the child or neighbor to carry out the torture and execution 
punishment as well.185  There was also a distinct effort on the part of the Chinese to 
eradicate Tibetan autonomy.  Tibetans were forced to exchange their currency at 
extremely unfavorable rates for the Chinese yuan.186  It was also during this period that 
the PRC began encouraging ethnic Han Chinese to migrate to Tibet.187  These actions 
against the Tibetan people drove tens of thousands into refugee camps in India and 
Nepal.188  Although these refugees fled for their own safety, it does reflect the cost-
benefit calculation that it had become to costly to live in their home country and that they 
did not see a positive expected value in continuing to resist.  When faced with the 
massive refugee movements, the Chinese created an incentive program for returning 
refugees.  The program gave incentives for weapons surrendered, as well as promised 
immunity from prosecution.189  Although the program failed to bring refugees back in 
large numbers, it does represent a calculated effort on the part of the Chinese to 
manipulate the cost-benefit analysis of the Tibetans' expected value of resistance.  The 
Chinese, by the end of this period in 1965, had essentially given Tibetans a choice: 
devalue your freedom and live as a subject of the PRC, or leave. 
Against the United States, China vacillated between openness and isolation, but 
the growing conflict in Vietnam soon became a significant issue between the two 
powers.190  Significant moves to counter the United States were made in aid distribution 
among underdeveloped countries in South America, Africa, and Asia, which improved 
China's international standing.191  China demonstrated it was willing to counter the 
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United States, but avoided direct confrontation, by massively increasing military aid to 
Vietnam.192  Overall, China did little to directly challenge the United States, or 
manipulate United States assistance to the Tibetans during this period. 
Against the regional actor, India, China clearly displayed an aggressive and 
dominant stance.  In response to patrols from the Indian Army along the disputed border 
region, China moved in full military force, destroying several Indian border outposts and 
prompting a month-long war, which it dominated.193  This solidified China's military 
dominance in the region.  In regional diplomatic maneuvers leading up to the war, China 
also sought to discredit India as overly tied to its colonial heritage, and a slave of the 
West.  Even though China quietly agreed to acknowledge colonial borders with Nepal 
and Bhutan, it derided India's claim to the British ―McMahon Line‖ as overly reliant on 
the colonial status quo.194  This was a clear attempt to manipulate relative standing 
among Asian countries, and although China was largely viewed as the aggressor in the 
conflict, it gained some benefit as well.195 
China entered 1965 in a much stronger position relative to its opponents.  By 
expanding costs to the Tibetan people and displaying military and diplomatic dominance 
over India, China improved its situation, but the United States was still in the game as a 
sponsor and the resistance would still continue. 
C. THE LATER YEARS: BREAKUP TO ENDGAME, 1965–1974 
By 1965, the relationship among the coalition's actors rapidly began to fall apart.  
India and China had settled their border dispute, and India was clearly not interested in 
pursuing Tibet's independence.  The United States became more and more distracted by 
events in Vietnam.  Many Tibetans eventually concluded that the benefit of their security  
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and safety in exile outweighed the utility of pursuing their freedom at home.  Meanwhile, 
the Chinese began stepping up the costs of the resistance significantly for the Tibetans, 
and changed the value of the Tibetan resistance for the Americans. 
1. Local Agent: Tibet 
By this time, the Tibetans had little benefit left to gain by continuing the armed 
resistance.  Recognizing that a guerilla campaign was best carried out with popular 
support, the CIA was resistant to providing equipment to the Mustang bases of the 
Chushi Gangdruk in Nepal.196  The final rounds of training at Camp Hale had even 
focused more on clandestine intelligence gathering than the guerilla warfare tactics the 
students had learned in the past.197  Funding continued for the Mustang rebels, but it was 
placed on a drawdown schedule, reducing the Tibetans' current and future expected 
benefits.  The costs incurred rose sharply during this time as well, in the form of Mao's 
Cultural Revolution.  Although the final conclusion was long in coming, the Chushi 
Gangdruk gave up its armed resistance to live in exile after the United States finally 
abandoned its support and the Dalai Lama appealed to the fighters for surrender. 
For the Tibetans, this phase began with two very inauspicious events.  The 
original commander of the Chushi Gangdruk, Gompo Tashi, finally succumbed to 
wounds sustained in 1958, and passed away on September 27, 1964.198  Shortly after this, 
training at Camp Hale was shut down and the Mustang rebels received their last airdrop 
from the CIA in May 1965.199  This drop was relatively large, including ―250 rifles, 
1,000 grenades, 6 mortars, 36 Bren guns, 42 Sten guns, 6 57mm recoilless rifles, 75 
handguns, and 72,000 rounds of ammunition‖ for the 1,865 remaining fighters.200  
However, the contents did not meet the expectations of the commander of the Mustang 
force, Baba Gen Yeshi, and he began stalling in response to radio requests for action 
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from his CIA sponsors.201  This would not be the only issue the CIA would have with 
Baba Gen Yeshi, a direct example of agency theory's moral hazard soon appeared in the 
Mustang camps.   
Up until this point, the CIA had correctly assumed that all funds and equipment 
would be dispersed fairly to the fighters.  However, this changed as reports in 1966 
accused Baba Gen Yeshi of ―gross mismanagement of the payroll, of selling ammunition 
and other supplies to his own troops instead of giving it to them, [and] of taking 
advantage of refugees as they came across the border.‖202  The Tibetan government in 
exile and the CIA were equally surprised and appalled by Gen Yeshi's betrayal and 
appointed Wangdu Gyatotsang, the fiercely patriotic nephew of the deceased commander 
Gompo Tashi, as Gen Yeshi's deputy to assist in overseeing the accounts in Mustang.203  
Wangdu had been one of the first six CIA trainees on Saipan, and he soon overtook day-
to-day operations and would eventually lead the Chushi Gangdruk to their last stand.    
Despite the difficulties in its implementation, some funding benefit did remain for 
the Tibetans from the United States.  In 1964, the CIA had approved $1,735,000 to ―keep 
the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among foreign 
nations, principally India, and to build a capability for resistance against possible political 
developments inside Communist China.‖204  The money included $500,000 for the 
fighters in Nepal, as well $225,000 for equipment and training, and concluded with a 
recommendation for long-term continuation of the program.205  The continuation, 
however, was not long-term.  By 1967, the portion of the funding ($180,000 annually) 
that supported the Dalai Lama came to an end and the rest would soon follow.206  In 
1971, as the United States was fully involved in rapprochement with China, the CIA 
established a three-year drawdown plan, where the Mustang fighters would continue to 
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be paid while a rehabilitation program was developed, which provided support for textile 
factories that could employ the fighters and their families as they demobilized in Nepal 
and India.207  The final termination of all official and covert funding from the United 
States to Tibet came in 1974.208  The resistance would not last much longer. 
The cost of resistance, or even identification as a Tibetan rose dramatically in 
1966, with Mao's implementation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.209  The 
Cultural Revolution was an attempt by Mao to achieve a renaissance of the CCP by 
destroying the ―Four Olds‖ (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), and 
replacing them with the ―Four News.‖210  For the Tibetans, this meant that all cultural 
identity was to be forsaken, to include the Tibetan language and Buddhist religion, which 
were declared impediments to the full implementation of socialism.211  The Red Guards, 
a new organization of zealous Han Chinese and Tibetan students, set to implementing the 
Cultural Revolution in Tibet by destroying every possible remnant of Tibetan 
Buddhism.212  Of the 370 monasteries that had survived in Tibet to 1965, only fifteen 
would remain by the end of the Cultural Revolution; of the estimated 114,000 monks, 
only 18,100 survived.213  These costs served to reinforce in the Tibetan mind that 
resistance to the CCP was of no benefit.  
These costs led a recalibration in the Tibetans' utility of freedom.  It was no 
longer worth fighting for.  While the resistance movement had always had difficulty 
operating as a true guerilla movement among the Chinese-controlled population, many 
Tibetans, after the harsh measures emplaced during the Cultural Revolution, now turned 
on the fighters.214  For fear of Chinese retribution, the population began to turn in the 
clandestine reconnaissance teams, even when the teams were not engaged in actual 
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fighting.215  This hostile environment is a clear indicator that many Tibetans remaining in 
Tibet proper no longer saw positive value in active resistance against the Chinese.216  The 
ultimate withdrawal of support came in 1974 as the Dalai Lama sent a personally 
recorded message to the fighters in Mustang asking them to surrender their arms and 
relocate to Dharamsala to join their countrymen in exile.  The 1,500 remaining fighters 
largely complied, although several chose suicide when faced with the choices of 
surrender or going against the wishes of the Dalai Lama.217  The final holdout was 
Wangdu, who on hearing the plea, fled with thirty armed men.  The Nepali army 
intercepted his group, however, and killed half of them, including Wangdu, before these 
last fighters could reach the Indian border.218  This was the final end of any armed 
resistance from the Tibetans against the Chinese. 
2. Global Principal: The United States 
The benefit the Tibetans brought to the United States at this time became one of 
relatively little value as military operations in Vietnam began to consume the interest of 
the national command.219  As the war in Vietnam wore on, the United States began to 
view China in a different light, and no longer valued disrupting China as much as it did 
placating China.  This would lead to the ultimate end of the Tibetan insurgency.  
Despite the corruption and inactivity of the Mustang commander, Baba Gen 
Yeshi, the United States still gained some benefit from the rebel force in the early years 
of this phase.  A Department of State memorandum from the Director of Intelligence 
Research outlined significant movements of Chinese troops along the Indo-Chinese 
border in response to the flare-up between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.  Although 
the source of the intelligence remains redacted in the document, the unclassified context 
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clearly indicates that it came from the Mustang reconnaissance teams.220  However, 
direct attacks on the PLA were now extremely rare.  The last recorded ambush came at 
the behest of Scottish missionary George Patterson, who had arrived in Mustang with a 
camera crew to document Tibetan resistance to the Chinese for his independent 
propaganda purposes.  While the ambush did successfully destroy a PLA patrol, 
including four trucks demolished and eight Chinese soldiers killed, it incensed the CIA 
that the Tibetans displayed such little thought to their operational security to allow 
themselves to be filmed for an outsider.221  The degradation of trust here, exacerbated by 
the lack of oversight the CIA was able to achieve on Mustang, led to a significant 
devaluation of the overall operation on the part of the United States.222  The CIA Tibet 
Task Force team leader at the time concluded that by 1967, ―it had become evident that 
the risks were not worth the scattered and peripheral intelligence to which these teams 
had access or their limited ability to organize resistance.‖223 
By the late 1960s, the United States' approach to China changed as well.  The 
move was from isolation to hesitant embrace, in recognition of the ―present and potential 
danger from Communist China.‖224  The year before he was elected president, Richard 
Nixon wrote in Foreign Affairs that, ―taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to 
leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its 
hates and threaten its neighbors.‖225  In practical terms, this meant that after he was 
elected, Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, would travel to 
China for direct talks with the PRC, which indirectly would ―generate pressures on Hanoi 
which would move the North Vietnamese toward a reasonable settlement of the 
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Indochina conflicts.‖226  This laid the groundwork for Nixon's ―dramatic visit to Beijing‖ 
in 1972 and the eventual normalization of diplomatic relations.227   
There is argument over whether Tibet was ever an issue to be solved in achieving 
rapprochement with China, and Kissinger denies that it ever was.228  However, Kissinger 
is suspected to have ultimately withdrawn the final support for Tibet,229 and regardless of 
whether Tibet was an explicit part of the discussion in normalizing relations with China, 
the United States no longer saw benefit in ―doing anything [it] could to get in the way of 
the Chinese Communists.‖230  Due to Secretary Kissinger's recalculation of the benefit of 
engaging with the Chinese, the Tibetans were no longer seen as beneficial to the United 
States and support was removed, causing their movement to collapse. 
3. Regional Agent: India 
This period would also see a drop in the value the Indians placed on armed 
conflict with China, causing significant decay in its relationship with the United States 
and support for the Tibetan cause.  The lack of central Chinese control over the Red 
Guards of the Cultural Revolution was a serious concern to India, as well as the 
successful test of a medium-range nuclear missile in October 1966.231  As a counter to 
growing Chinese influence in the region, India began to align itself with the Soviet 
Union.232  This move may have been internally popular, but it sunk Indo-American 
relations and increased the difficulty for the CIA to conduct operations with both the 
Mustang guerillas, and in assistance of the Tibetan government in exile.233  During this 
time, present costs did not rise greatly for the Indians, but potential future costs did with 
the advent of the Chinese nuclear weapon.  Although the probability of its use was very 
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low, until India could acquire a symmetric capability, it was at a disadvantage.  The 
benefits, both present and future expected, fell for the Indians.  With the overall costs 
rising, even modestly, but the benefits falling, India no longer had much interest in 
promoting or maintaining the Tibetan insurgents. 
4. The Adversary: China 
During this period, the PRC expanded its diplomatic relationship with the United 
States and secured one of its ultimate strategic goals of moving out of isolation on the 
world stage.234  After reading Nixon's article in Foreign Affairs, Mao distributed it as 
required reading among the CCP leadership, and shortly after Nixon's election, invited 
the United States to ambassador-level meetings in early 1969.235  Normalization of the 
relationship would take some time, but for the Chinese, it would mean an end to external 
support for the Tibetan insurgency.  Although the Chinese had dealt significant blows to 
the Tibetans at the tactical level, and removed significant popular support at the 
operational level, the Tibetan insurgency was not fully terminated until the insurgents lost 
their global sponsor.  By inducing the principal to remove support for his agent, the 
Chinese were rid of the problems the agent was causing for them. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The principal-agent theory for unconventional warfare states that if each party in 
an unconventional warfare coalition (made up of a global principal, regional agent, and 
local agent) has a positive expected value in the conduct of the campaign, then the 
campaign is likely to continue.  At the point where one or more of the actors no longer 
sees a positive expected value, the coalition will disintegrate, bringing the campaign to an 
end.  The expected value for each actor consists of a present cost and benefit, a future 
cost and benefit, and the probability that the future cost and benefit will be incurred.  The 
significance here is the recognition that the interests are not the same; however, the 
interests become aligned when the parties recognize an overall positive expected value in 
pursuing the unconventional warfare campaign. 
This model is clearly demonstrated in the case of Operation ST CIRCUS.  Even 
though the United States did not share the Tibetans' ultimate goal of territorial 
independence, their interests in pursuing an insurgency were aligned with the United 
States as a sponsor, and the Tibetans as the combatants, because both saw something to 
gain from the operation.  The Dalai Lama summed it up well: ―The CIA was pursuing a 
global policy against Communist China, while we were opposing Communist aggression 
in our country; our basic aims did not clash, so we accepted it [assistance from the 
CIA].‖236  As the Chinese manipulated the cost-benefit analysis of each player involved, 
the coalition gradually crumbled.  Even though the PLA was militarily dominant over the 
Tibetan guerrillas, it was not until the United States' interests changed as a global sponsor 
and withdrew support that the armed Tibetan movement came to a close. 
The principal-agent model for unconventional warfare is a useful framework for 
analyzing the alignment of interests among the various actors in a coalition that foments 
an insurgency against their adversary.  However, it does not answer all questions or 
explain all actions in a case study.  Problems in the application of agency theory to 
unconventional warfare stem, ironically, from one of the main ingredients in agency 
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theory.  Due to the covert and clandestine nature of UW and its related activities, 
information is not always available to determine actions that each party conducts while a 
campaign is ongoing.  Furthermore, information on the motives and interests of each 
actor are equally unclear.  In the absence of clear empirical evidence for analysis, one 
must rely much more on assumption and inference, which will weaken the final 
conclusions.  However, if care is applied in attempting to determine present costs and 
benefits, future costs and benefits, and the probability of achieving those future costs and 
benefits for each actor, this framework will be extremely useful in understanding why the 
actors behave the way they do. 
The context of the insurgency matters as well.  Agency theory, to be applicable, 
requires a coalition scenario, where the insurgent movement has a sponsor.  However, 
insurgencies don't always require a sponsor to start or continue.  While this may be the 
case, studies show that insurgencies with no foreign sponsorship or aid are significantly 
less likely to succeed.237  In the case of Operation ST CIRCUS, the final stand of the 
fighters that refused to surrender is an example of this.238  Once international opinion 
turns against the insurgency, it becomes increasingly difficult to operate.  Due to the great 
value of a global sponsor to the local insurgents, it becomes worthwhile to apply agency 
theory principals in an analytical framework in the study of an unconventional warfare 
case. 
Finally, the model does not necessarily examine all relationships 
comprehensively.  In the vast amounts of literature describing the Sino-American 
relationship between 1956 and 1974, Tibet is rarely mentioned, and much of the literature 
focuses almost exclusively on the status of Taiwan and the various stances the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and China took towards each other.239  The final Tibet Task 
Force team leader, John Kenneth Knaus describes the Tibetans as the ―orphans of the 
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Cold War.‖240  Although Tibet was a marginally significant aspect of Sino-American 
relations, the resources expended on both sides suggest that it did have some value.  
Despite these limitations to the model, proper analysis of the cost-benefit factors involved 
in aligning variant interests will provide great insight into an unconventional warfare 
campaign. 
Agency theory clearly applies in an unconventional warfare campaign.  It is easily 
applied to the case of Tibet in Operation ST CIRCUS. Aid that the United States 
provided, through Pakistan, to Afghan insurgents fighting their Soviet-backed 
government is another campaign that could further validate the principal-agent model for 
UW. Other potential cases could include Chinese support for the Viet Cong, French 
support for the American Revolution, and American support for the Northern Alliance 
against the Taliban.  By expanding the application of the model to many different cases, 
its validity will be further confirmed, or caveats to its effectiveness may be developed. 
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